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Incorporating the Hendricksons 
Larry E. Ribstein  
ABSTRACT 
The family is evolving rapidly, but not fast enough for some 
people. Several commentators suggest freeing family law of its 
traditional constraints by applying the contractual business 
association model. Business models, though superficially similar to 
domestic relationships, ultimately are unhelpful or counter-
productive to defining the family. This Article discusses the essential 
differences between business and domestic partnerships and the 
potential havoc from trying to merge the two. 
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The concept of the family is evolving faster than the legal 
structures necessary to accommodate it. The need for additional legal 
structures for domestic relationships has been highlighted by stories 
about the legal problems of same-sex couples and the portrayal of the 
polygamous Hendrickson family on the television show Big Love, 
who try to cope with daily domestic life without an accepted legal 
framework.
1
  
Since states have not fully recognized or developed legal forms 
for alternative domestic relationships, it is tempting for several 
reasons to fill the gap with existing business association standard 
forms, including the limited liability company (LLC), the limited and 
general partnership, and the corporation. Business associations offer 
the flexibility that family law currently lacks, as well as a choice-of-
law rule—the internal affairs doctrine—which could facilitate rapid 
legal acceptance and evolution of alternatives to standard-form 
marriage. Business association statutes also provide convenient off-
the-rack rules regarding such issues as formation, governance, and 
exit that also exist in domestic relationships. Furthermore, the agency 
and opportunism problems that business association statutes deal with 
resemble those that arise in domestic relationships. Thus, it is not 
 
 1. Big Love premiered on HBO in March 2006 and ran for five seasons, ending in March 
2011. 
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surprising that commentators have turned to business association law 
as the relief from the existing legal constraints on same-sex marriage 
and other non-traditional domestic relationships.
2
 Scholars have also 
embraced a general analogy between marriage and partnership in tax, 
estate, and divorce law, particularly because it furthers women’s 
autonomy.
3
  
This Article analyzes the issues concerning the use of business 
associations for domestic relationships. States would have to amend 
current partnership law to accommodate non-business family 
relationships,
4
 but LLCs already may be used for a non-business 
purpose.
5
 The critical question is whether the law should move in this 
direction.  
Some might object that using business associations for domestic 
relationships could cause social harm by commodifying personal 
relationships. However, there is no clear dividing line between ―love‖ 
relationships and ―money‖ relationships. Business relationships, like 
marriage, may be founded significantly on trust and altruism. 
Spouses may be business partners whose business and personal lives 
are intertwined. Even purely domestic relationships may have 
features that can be explained by the same economic theories that 
apply to businesses. The hazy boundary between love and money 
invites the analogies drawn between business associations and 
domestic relationships. 
 
 2. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1779 (2005) 
(arguing that marriage law, like business association law, is evolving away from state control); 
Jennifer A. Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying Business 
Partnership and Family Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2007) (suggesting a domestic 
partnership model based on business partnership law for family relationships); Martha M. 
Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 79, 84 (2001) (suggesting ―importing elements of business law to improve domestic 
relations law‖); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (arguing for partnership model for 
polygamous relationships). 
 3. See sources cited supra note 2.  
 4. See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202, 6 U.L.A. 27 (1997) (permitting use of 
partnership only by an ―association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit‖).  
 5. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 4:10, nn.5–6 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing purpose limitations in LLC 
statutes). 
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A significant problem with using business associations for 
families is that it is essentially an exercise in rhetoric or wishful 
thinking rather than a robust policy analysis that can support major 
changes in family law. Although advocates of the business 
association model of family law may have legitimate policy reasons 
for wanting to loosen the legal ties that constrain the development of 
families, the business association analogy adds little to these 
arguments. As proponents of the business association model 
recognize, domestic relationships differ in many respects from 
business associations.
6
 These differences go to the heart of the policy 
debates on family law. If it were not for policy considerations relating 
to such issues as the need to preserve intimacy and protect children, 
families might be like business associations and therefore should be 
treated under the same standard forms. However, merely applying the 
business association model cannot settle the underlying issues about 
whether the model should be applied.  
To be sure, the business association model can constructively 
identify a mechanism for creating a contractual model of domestic 
association and thereby contribute to the resolution of policy issues 
concerning this model. However, the basic point of this Article is 
that, even if a contractual model of the family is appropriate on 
policy grounds, the differences between business associations and 
domestic relationships likely would continue to demand qualitatively 
different standard forms. In other words, although business 
associations may be a useful device for loosening the constraints on 
families, their use in this context would leave domestic relationships 
with a heavy burden of inappropriate law.  
The need for different standard forms arises from general 
considerations that apply to all relationships, business or domestic. 
Standard forms provide significant guidance for courts and the parties 
in ordering relationships. Indeed, advocates of the business 
association model have recognized the need for different domestic 
 
 6. See, e.g., Case, supra note 2, at 1778–79 (observing that the ―law of marriage has not 
yet finished evolving‖ away from state control to the extent that corporate law had done); 
Drobac & Page, supra note 2 (proposing partnership-based laws for domestic relationships that 
differ in several respects from partnership because of differences between families and 
domestic relationships); Ertman, supra note 2 (discussing similarities and differences between 
various domestic relationships and their business association counterparts).  
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standard forms.
7
 The same reasoning justifying differences among 
domestic relationships should raise questions about appropriate 
analogies between business and domestic relationships. For example, 
issues concerning children and intimacy will likely demand different 
default rules than those applying to business relationships, even in a 
more contractual version of the family than the law recognizes today. 
These differences mean that using the same types of standard forms 
for both types of relationships may cause the forms to lose much of 
their coherence and, therefore, their value as standard forms. This 
would impair both marriage and business law.  
Part I of this Article discusses the general functional similarities 
between business associations and domestic standard forms that make 
the application of business association model to domestic 
relationships at least superficially attractive. Part II discusses the 
fundamental differences between the two types of relationships that 
make this strategy ultimately unworkable. Part III discusses how 
alternative standard forms might evolve for domestic associations to 
provide the same benefits in this area of law that they do for business 
associations. Part IV concludes. 
I. DOMESTIC AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
The analogy between business and domestic associations rests on 
these standard forms’ similar functions and the fact that they address 
similar considerations.
8
 The following subparts discuss the analogy’s 
two prongs.  
A. The Role of Standard Forms 
For both domestic and business associations, the availability of 
multiple standard forms helps clarify the parties’ relationships and 
thereby increases contracting opportunities.
9
 The following sections 
describe these functions of standard forms.  
 
 7. See Drobac & Page, supra note 2, at 402–06 (proposing different types of domestic 
partnerships); Ertman, supra note 2, at 99–131 (suggesting different business association 
analogies for different types of domestic relationships).  
 8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 9. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 24–38 (2010) [hereinafter 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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1. Transaction Costs 
Marriage law, like business association law, can economize on 
contracting costs, which can be significant in a long-term 
relationship. The parties to both types of relationships know they 
cannot predict the future and therefore make flexible arrangements to 
deal with problems as they arise. Standard forms save the parties the 
costs of specifying management, dissolution, and fiduciary rights of 
partners or spouses. This is particularly helpful to the extent the 
relationship calls for detailed rules covering rare and distant events. 
The costs of customized drafting and planning for divorce may be 
high. The parties also may unreasonably discount the probability of 
divorce while in the happy throes of wedding plans,
10
 or may not 
want to contaminate their relationship with negotiations over 
breakup. Parties therefore may not plan for divorce even if this 
planning has significant benefits in enhancing the stability of the 
relationship and reducing the likelihood of opportunistic conduct.  
The cost savings from standard forms depend on how well the 
forms are designed for the types of relationships to which they are 
likely to apply. A single standard form may not fit diverse 
relationships. An ill-fitting standard form might actually increase 
transaction costs by forcing parties to incur higher drafting costs than 
they would under more suitable forms or even in the absence of a 
form.
11
 For example, as discussed in more detail below, relationships 
between two working domestic partners may require different default 
rules than those between a working spouse and a homemaker.  
2. Interpretation 
Standard forms assist interpretation of the parties’ contracts.12 A 
statute designed for domestic relationships may be construed 
 
RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION]; Larry E. Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach to Same-Sex 
Marriage, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 309, 317–21 (2005) [hereinafter Ribstein, Standard Form]. 
 10. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average, 
17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443–44 (1993) (showing evidence indicating that people are 
unrealistically optimistic about whether their marriages will succeed). 
 11. Cf. RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, supra note 9, at 24, 31–32. 
 12. See Ribstein, Standard Form, supra note 9, at 319. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Incorporating the Hendricksons 279 
 
 
differently than one for business partnerships, just as the fact that a 
business is a partnership might lead to a different interpretation than 
if it is a corporation. Parties adopting a standard form implicitly agree 
to have the form’s background rules govern situations not covered by 
their customized contract. A standard form gives rise to an 
interpretive network of cases that can reduce uncertainty about the 
applicable rules and thereby aid both ex ante in planning and ex post 
in litigation.
13
 The cases are less useful for this purpose if they deal 
with disparate relationships. It follows that standard forms need to be 
designed for categories of transactions that are large enough to 
generate a useful interpretive network but small and coherent enough 
that cases can guide future transactions and litigation.  
3. Framing and Norms 
Standard forms can be useful in ―framing‖ conduct and thereby 
assisting in the formation of norms.
14
 As discussed below, the norms 
associated with being married may differ from those associated with 
being in a business relationship, particularly because of the parties’ 
mutual trust in the former setting. Differences may exist not only 
between marriage and business associations, but also between two-
person and multiple-person marriages, with weaker trust in the latter 
situation.
15
 Weaker trust settings may need stronger duties to deter 
opportunistic conduct than would be needed in settings with stronger 
trust.
16
  
4. Signaling  
Standard forms can enable parties to signal their conduct. For 
example, marriage is generally understood as a long-term 
commitment to a single partner, while business associations facilitate 
 
 13. See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 826–34 (1995) (discussing the benefits of default rules in 
corporate contract). 
 14. See Ribstein, Standard Form, supra note 9, at 320.  
 15. See Davis, supra note 2, at 2004–13 (discussing how plural marriages compare to 
corporate partnerships and two-person marriages and the need for different default rules in 
different types of marriages). 
 16. Various types of trust are discussed infra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
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exit through buyout or transfer of shares in order to enable business 
people to move on to other opportunities. Parties’ willingness to enter 
into some types of domestic associations accordingly may signal 
more commitment than forming a business partnership.
17
 
Relationships such as domestic partnership could occupy the middle 
ground between marriage and business associations, with 
implications for the signals parties send when they enter the 
relationships. 
B. Problems Addressed by Standard Form Rules 
Standard forms not only serve similar functions in the domestic 
and business contexts, but also address similar types of problems in 
these two contexts. Both domestic and business associations attempt 
to add value by facilitating cooperation toward achieving common 
goals. To accomplish this purpose, standard form rules must provide 
a legal framework for dealing with problems associated with self-
seeking behavior, most importantly, opportunism and agency costs.  
1. Opportunism 
Contracts attempt to constrain the parties from self-seeking that 
can undermine a cooperative relationship. No contract does this 
perfectly because of enforcement costs, including the time, expense, 
and uncertainty of a judicial proceeding. These costs can be 
particularly high in close-knit relationships, such as small 
partnerships and marriages, which depend on the parties working 
together rather than fighting in courtrooms or depositions.  
Consider the comparable situations that can arise in both domestic 
and business arrangements. A party to a domestic relationship might 
invest labor in maintaining the home and raising children in order to 
allow the other party to go to work and build the family’s wealth. The 
stay-at-home party reasonably expects a payoff in sharing in the 
 
 17. See Antonio Nicolo & Piero Tedeschi, Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of Not 
Signing a Prenuptial Agreement 3–4 (Univ. of Padua Econ. Discussion, Working Paper No. 39-
2003, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=555261 (noting that 
couples also can send a commitment signal by choosing not to make pre-nuptial agreements 
that would reduce the cost of divorce). 
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wealth the other spouse has created. A working spouse who seeks a 
divorce prior to this payoff may be able to appropriate the home 
spouse’s intangible and hard-to-value investment.18  
The classic California case of Page v. Page
19
 illustrates the 
analogous situation in a business association. Two brothers built a 
linen supply business in California, one providing some of the money 
and the other managerial expertise.
20
 The business went nowhere for 
years until it started to get a boost from the expansion of a nearby 
military base. The manager-brother chose that point in time to 
dissolve the partnership.
21
 As with the wife’s investment in the 
marriage, the payoff from the non-managing brother’s investment 
was impossible to value at the time of dissolution, in this case 
because the firm’s future at the moment of the base expansion was 
unclear. This effectively enabled the manager to appropriate the value 
of the business by dissolving it and buying the assets. 
Parties to both domestic and business may suffer a loss of 
investment that can frustrate their expectations. Opportunism may 
take many other forms in modern and more complex business and 
domestic relationships such as those portrayed in Big Love, where 
husband Bill’s and his three wives’ ambitions and objectives often 
compete. Perhaps more importantly, similarly situated parties might 
be reluctant to make such investments in the future if they see they 
have no effective remedy for opportunism. The problem with 
designing the remedy is that exit from the association or exercise of 
voting or other powers can both give rise to and protect the members 
from opportunism. For example, increasing exit costs can force 
spouses and partners to suffer cheating or abuse by their mates or 
partners but also encourage them to cooperate.
22
 
 
 18. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best 
Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 267–68 (1987) (comparing a marriage to a contract, 
with investments and expectations by both parties, and discussing how women lose their 
―value‖ in the marriage market more rapidly than men and are therefore at greater risk of 
having their investments expropriated in a divorce). 
 19. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961). 
 20. See id. at 42, 44.  
 21. Id. at 44. 
 22. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 9, 50–54 (1990) (arguing that precommitment strategies that increase the costs of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:273 
 
 
The parties might mitigate counterproductive self-seeking through 
detailed partnership or ante-nuptial agreements. However, as 
discussed above, these agreements are costly and necessarily 
incomplete, and the parties may unreasonably discount their benefits. 
The parties also can use an off-the-shelf standard form to provide 
rules and remedies for situations in which opportunism is most likely 
to occur. For example, partnership law has traditionally provided for 
penalties for dissolving a partnership prior to an agreed term or 
undertaking.
23
 This reflects an assumption that premature dissolution 
is most likely to involve appropriation of a partner’s investment 
before it can be accurately valued and apportioned to the non-
dissolving partner.  
2. Agency Costs 
The members of a firm or spouses in a marriage typically agree to 
make disparate types and amounts of contributions, with one partner 
or spouse providing services or capital and delegating management 
power to the other partner or spouse. This reflects the uneven 
distribution of management and service talents across the 
participants. A potential cost of delegation and specialization is that 
the party holding the power to act on behalf of the others (husband 
Bill Hendrickson in the Big Love scenario, for example) may be 
tempted to use that power for individual rather than joint benefit. The 
resulting ―agency costs‖ include the principal’s costs of monitoring 
the agent, the agent’s cost of furnishing a bond to secure the principal 
against agency costs, and the residual costs of cheating that cannot be 
eliminated by monitoring and bonding.
24
 In a business association, 
the main constraints on agency costs include members’ rights to vote 
on managers’ actions, fiduciary duties, and the members’ ability to 
exit the firm and be paid based on the value of the firm’s assets 
 
dissolution may actually increase cooperation during the marriage, thereby decreasing behavior 
that may lead to divorce).  
 23. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 31(2), 38(2) (1914). 
 24. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). It should be 
noted that agency costs arise in any relationship where there is cooperative effort, and they are 
not limited to where there is a clear principal-agent relationship. Id. at 309. 
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without any discount for mismanagement. As discussed below, these 
constraints may differ in domestic and business associations because 
the former have other trust-inducing mechanisms.  
3. Non-financial Considerations 
Business and domestic associations might seem to differ in that 
the former are intended primarily to earn and distribute financial 
gains while the latter produce primarily non-financial goods such as 
love, mutual support, and children. This may be significant to the 
extent that non-financial behavior connotes more altruism than purely 
commercial behavior.
25
 On the other hand, both types of associations 
involve a mix of financial and non-financial concerns that could 
affect the roles of trust and norms.  
Trust can be divided into weak and strong forms.
26
 Weak-form 
trust refers to the ―beneficiary’s‖ decision to rely on the ―trustee‖ 
because the legal and extra-legal constraints on the trustee’s conduct 
make that reliance reasonable.
27
 In other words, the probability-
adjusted gain from relying exceeds the probability-adjusted loss from 
the trustee’s breach (PG x G > PL x L). Strong-form trust is the 
particular type of reliance on another who is not subject to costly 
constraints. This form of trust creates social value because it enables 
reliance without costly enforcement.  
Strong-form trust is particularly important to social welfare. 
Although the law cannot create strong-form trust,
28
 the existence of 
this trust reduces the need for legal constraints. An important 
difference between business associations and domestic relations is 
 
 25. The significance of the distinction is, however, far from clear in the business context. 
Compare Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011), with Anup 
Malani & Albert Choi, Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in Disguise? Evidence from 
Executive Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry (Sept. 26, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=617362 (comparison of for-profit and non-profit executive 
compensation supports the hypothesis that non-profit firm managers at least seem to care about 
profits as much as those in for-profit firms), and Anup Malani & Guy David, Does Nonprofit 
Status Signal Auality?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 551 (2008) (finding little evidence that non-profit 
hospitals and day-care providers advertised their status).  
 26. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2001) [hereinafter 
Ribstein, Trust]. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
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that strong-form trust is more likely to arise in the latter situation than 
in the former because of the love and intimacy between domestic 
partners.
29
  
Social norms are potentially significant in both domestic and 
business associations. Because the parties may expect different 
standards of behavior to apply in the two types of relationships, it is 
useful to frame behavior in the two contexts by providing different 
standard forms. By the same token, two-person marriages may differ 
from less intimate multiple-person relationships. In both business and 
domestic associations strong fiduciary duties help establish norms of 
trustworthy behavior.
30
  
II. DOMESTIC VS. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Part I showed that domestic and business association standard 
forms perform similar functions and deal with similar underlying 
problems in long-term relationships.
31
 These similarities support 
analogies between business and domestic standard forms. This Part 
highlights the dangers that lurk in these analogies. Fundamental 
differences between the two categories of standard forms reflect the 
different social functions of business and domestic relationships. 
These differences support maintaining distinctions between standard 
forms within the domestic and business categories as well as across 
the domestic/business divide.  
A. General Considerations 
This Subpart discusses general considerations that drive the 
specific differences discussed in Subpart B. These involve separation 
between the organization and the individuals, trust and confidence 
 
 29. Id. at 563.  
 30. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001) (discussing norms in corporate law); Edward B. Rock, Saints 
and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1021–63 
(1997) (discussing the emergence of norms governing large corporate buyouts in Delaware); 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) (discussing 
the use of shaming as punishment in corporate law). 
 31. See discussion supra Part I. 
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between the members, and the broader social effects of governing the 
organizations.  
1. Separate Entities 
The separation of a business’s assets and liabilities from those of 
its members or contributors is a basic function of business association 
law.
32
 This separation enables entrepreneurs to take risks without 
endangering their personal capital and to associate with others 
without concern that their co-owners’ activities will threaten the 
firm.
33
 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire see the separation of firms 
from families as an important thread in the history of business law.
34
 
They show how the development of information and other 
technologies enabled creditors and investors to access reliable 
information about the assets of business entities, which in turn 
encouraged investments outside of personal and family circles.
35
 
Separate business entities also facilitate investments through tradable 
shares in firms that outlive their owners and compensation 
mechanisms that align managers’ incentives with the firm’s goals.36  
Domestic association activities, by contrast, inherently are those 
of the individual participants. The family might be conceptualized as 
a distinct entity in the sense of producing outputs such as children 
from inputs such as cash, food, and shelter.
37
 However, the family’s 
goals are inseparable from those of the individual family members.
38
 
As discussed below, the distinction between business entities as 
 
 32. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000). 
 33. Id. at 398–99.  
 34. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (describing the historical evolution of entity shielding and its 
importance to the development of business law). 
 35. Id. at 1355.  
 36. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WITH 
ENDOGENOUS ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 67–76 (2009). 
 37. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed. 1991) 
(applying economic theory and analysis to the family). 
 38. Professor Ertman argues that marriages, like corporations, are organizations. 
However, even if domestic associations might be considered organizations in some sense, they 
are not separate from their members in the important sense of having objectives different from 
those of their members. Ertman, supra note 2, at 112–20. 
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discrete mechanisms for risk-taking and domestic associations as 
ways of carrying on the individuals’ personal lives has important 
ramifications for structuring the default and mandatory rules of the 
two types of associations. 
2. Trust 
As discussed above, ―strong-form‖ trust is socially valuable in 
that it reduces the need for other mechanisms to induce weak-form 
trust, or reliance. Indeed, constraints may be counterproductive in 
reducing or ―crowding out‖ strong-form trust. It follows that strong-
form trust’s presence in families and comparative absence in business 
associations is an important basis for distinguishing the two contexts. 
For example, duties and other devices for inducing reliance may be 
less necessary or desirable in families than in business associations. 
Also, as noted above, two-person marriages may differ from those 
among multiple persons.  
This difference between domestic and business standard forms is 
comparable to that between various business association standard 
forms. Close-knit, family-like partnerships generally have a higher 
level of strong-form trust than do publicly held corporations. 
Contrary to the implications of Justice Cardozo’s famously strong 
view of partners’ duties in Meinhard v. Salmon,39 this suggests less 
rather than more need for fiduciary duties in partnerships than in 
corporations. The strong fiduciary rhetoric in Meinhard arguably was 
intended to reinforce the norms appropriate to the parties’ close-knit 
relationship.
40
  
3. Externalities and Mandatory Rules 
Both business and domestic associations entail potential social 
costs and benefits that their owners do not internalize. The internal 
rules of these organizations depend on society’s views of potential 
externalities in each category.  
 
 39. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that partners owe a duty of ―[n]ot honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive‖). 
 40. See Ribstein, Standard Form, supra note 9, at 320. 
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With respect to business associations, markets play an important 
role. In order to earn profits, firms must convince others to buy their 
goods on open markets. Firms that fail to earn financial profits do not 
survive in the long run. Specific regulation can address specific 
problems with markets.  
Market constraints on domestic associations are less robust. 
Women may need protection because of their economic 
subordination in marriage and society, and the spouses’ conduct can 
profoundly affect children. Moreover, because of the family’s 
important role as a personal support structure, society arguably has a 
stronger interest in shaping the prevailing types of domestic 
associations than it does for business associations in encouraging 
experimentation.  
As with the other considerations discussed above, differences 
between business and domestic relationships regarding the role of 
externalities and regulation may be comparable to those among 
different business associations. In publicly held firms, laws protect 
investors who lack any bargaining interface with the firm and protect 
society from firms whose power rivals that of government. The law 
can use a lighter hand with closely held firms, whose owners bargain 
face-to-face and which have less impact on society.  
B. Specific Differences 
This Subpart shows how the general considerations discussed in 
Subpart A shape rules in the business and domestic association 
contexts.  
1. Formation 
Domestic and business standard forms clarify how relationships to 
which the standard forms’ rules apply are created. Marriage in this 
respect is treated like a corporation (resting on a formal state process) 
rather than like a partnership (applying to relationships that meet a 
statutory definition even in the absence of formalities).
41
  
 
 41. See Ertman, supra note 2, at 112–20 (analogizing marriage to corporation partly 
because of formalities in both contexts).  
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It may seem strange that marriage follows the corporate rather 
than the partnership model regarding the need for formality, since the 
more intimate partnership seems to fit marriage better than 
partnership in other respects. One explanation is that marriage seeks 
to channel relationships toward a specific type of commitment.
42
 This 
requires the state to define favored and disfavored relationships. This 
reflects a view that society has a greater interest in who is married 
than it does in who are business partners.  
Using marriage to channel domestic relationships could be 
accomplished without formalities simply by defining the 
relationships the state deems to be marriages, just as partnership law 
determines which informal relationships constitute partnerships.
43
 
The requirement of formal state certification reflects the precise level 
of importance the state (as distinguished from the married couple) 
attaches to the particular relationship of marriage. For example, in 
Big Love, Barb Hendrickson (one of the wives) thought her daughter 
Sarah’s vows in her family’s backyard were more important than the 
mere ―contract with the state‖ Sarah was planning to enter into at the 
courthouse.
44
 Margene (another wife) explains her legal marriage to 
Anna’s boyfriend as less important than her religious marriage to the 
Hendricksons.
45
 First wife Barb’s divorce from and second wife 
Nicky’s marriage to Bill are portrayed as having legal implications 
that differ from their personal and religious importance.
46
 
The marriage license serves other functions that highlight 
marriage’s differences from partnership. It notifies the world that a 
couple is married, which is important given the significant 
consequences of marriage. It also certifies the validity of the 
marriage, reflecting the need for state approval. This contrasts with 
the ―statement of partnership authority‖ that partners can file in some 
 
 42. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
495, 507 (1992) (―[M]arriage offers people a kind of relationship with social and legal 
advantages which are primarily available precisely because the law gives marriage a special 
status.‖). 
 43. See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997) (defining partnership as co-
ownership of a business for profit); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 1 BROMBERG 
& RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.01(a) (discussing definition of partnership).  
 44. Big Love: The Greater Good (HBO television broadcast Jan. 17, 2010).  
 45. Big Love: Blood Atonement (HBO television broadcast Feb. 21, 2010).  
 46. Big Love: ’Til Death Do Us Part (HBO television broadcast Feb. 27, 2010). 
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states which serves notice but requires no special state permission.
47
 
And the requirement of obtaining a marriage license also helps ensure 
that the parties have considered the seriousness of the commitment 
the state is having them make through marriage.
48
  
2. Management 
Spouses may delegate authority to each other to act alone on 
behalf of the household in particular areas, such as the wife running 
the house day-to-day and the husband making important financial 
decisions and big-ticket purchases. A domestic association does not, 
however, lend itself to the sort of clear separation of management and 
ownership that partnerships and LLCs may accomplish by 
designating a managing partner or managing members. Because 
domestic associations are closely identified with the individual 
participants, formal delegation of control could cause an undesirable 
loss of personal autonomy. It is one thing to facilitate risk-taking and 
entrepreneurial activity by delegating control over a business, and 
another to allow people to delegate control over their personal lives.  
3. Agency 
Even if spouses would be unwilling to completely relinquish 
management power over aspects of the relationship, they might be 
willing to delegate power to contract with third parties in order to 
reduce the transaction costs of running a household. The spouses 
could then sort out between themselves the consequences of 
unauthorized action. Indeed, spouses can be agents for each other 
even if they do not carry on a business.
49
 However, consistent with 
 
 47. See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (1997). 
 48. Indeed, given this commitment, some commentators have suggested going further and 
mandating more planning and counseling as a prerequisite to marriage. See Drobac & Page, 
supra note 2, at 407–08 (suggesting mandatory ex ante agreements for domestic partnerships 
and full disclosure of assets); see also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of 
Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998) (suggesting ex ante 
contracting in marriage). Some states have ―covenant marriage‖ laws making marriage more 
difficult to exit and requiring ex ante counseling. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 
-906 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:272 (2008). 
 49. See, e.g., Daggett v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 348 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) 
(husband liable as principal for wife’s department store bill). 
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the considerations discussed above supporting limits on delegating 
management power, marriage law constrains spouses’ ability to bind 
each other outside of standard partnership or agency relationships.
50
 
The courts recognize that spouses’ control over each other is 
inherently limited by the high costs the law places on exit in the form 
of alimony, equitable distribution, and child support.
51
 The law 
therefore has to protect spouses from their mates’ profligacy, subject 
to the need to protect third party creditors from deliberate abuse of 
these limitations on authority for asset protection purposes.
52
 Thus, 
one suggestion for a so-called ―partnership‖ model of marriage would 
limit domestic partners’ authority to bind other partners to situations 
when the non-acting partner is incapacitated.
53
  
4. Property 
As discussed above, an important objective of business 
association law is separating business from personal property. This 
enables business association owners to decide how much of their 
personal property to commit to each of their business ventures. 
Domestic association law also allows for some separation in the sense 
that the marital partners can agree to keep some of their property 
separate both during the relationship and on exit, even in community 
property jurisdictions. 
A key difference between business and domestic relationships 
regarding property rules concerns partners’ obligation to contribute to 
their co-partners’ welfare. Business owners can form limited liability 
firms that insulate all of their personal property from business 
creditors. Although general partnership law provides a default rule of 
owner personal liability to creditors for debts the firm incurs, even 
general partners have no obligation to contribute capital to or incur 
debts for the enterprise.
54
 By contrast, domestic associations provide 
 
 50. See Marie T. Reilly, In Good Times and In Debt: The Evolution of Marital Agency 
and the Meaning of Marriage, 87 NEB. L. REV. 373 (2008).  
 51. Id. at 417–18.  
 52. Id. at 418–19. 
 53. See Drobac & Page, supra note 2, at 408 (suggesting limiting partners’ authority to 
bind other partners the situation when a partner is incapacitated). 
 54. See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 307 (1997). 
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for spousal support obligations by requiring spouses to commit some 
property to their spouses’ and children’s needs during the marriage 
and on marital dissolution.
55
 These rules reflect families’ fundamental 
social role of providing a first level of support for individuals.  
5. Fiduciary Duties 
Courts define fiduciary duties very broadly to include a wide 
range of obligations intended to protect vulnerable parties from 
opportunistic conduct.
56
 However, a more precise and accurate view 
of the fiduciary duty is that it is a duty of unselfishness that arises 
when one party delegates open-ended control over her property to 
another.
57
 Open-ended delegation of control defines situations in 
which agency costs are likely to be significant and not adequately 
controlled by monitoring mechanisms. In this situation, a strong duty 
of unselfishness is needed to adequately discipline fiduciary conduct. 
The duty of unselfishness is also easier for courts to police than a 
duty that involves judicial evaluation of the fiduciary’s decisions.58  
Fiduciary duties may not play the same role in domestic as in 
business associations. Strong-form trust arising out of the spouses’ 
love and affection enforces reliance in these relationships. Indeed, 
legally enforced duties may erode this trust because the legal 
discipline and damages for cheating can overshadow stronger bonds 
of love and affection.
59
 Also, family relationships do not involve the 
sort of open-ended delegation of power for which fiduciary duties are 
appropriate. The spouses presumably will monitor each other rather 
than delegate open-ended control over aspects of their lives that 
intimately affect them.  
 
 55. This approach has been reflected even in a business association model of domestic 
partnership law. See Drobac & Page, supra note 2, at 410–12 (suggesting a community property 
model for all income earned during partnership and compelling joint spousal responsibility for 
children).  
 56. For a comprehensive review of fiduciary duties, see TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY 
LAW (2010). 
 57. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215 
[hereinafter Ribstein, Partners]; Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011). 
 58. Id. at 215–17.  
 59. See Ribstein, Trust, supra note 26, at 580–84. 
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Most domestic cases dealing with what courts call fiduciary 
relationships actually involve a party’s abuse of confidential 
information.
60
 An important example is United States v. Chestman,
61
 
which held that a husband did not misappropriate information from 
his wife concerning the family business because family members had 
not indicated through sharing of business secrets that they were 
depending on each other to maintain confidentiality.
62
 A dissent 
reasoned that there was misappropriation because the insider 
expected benefits from the family’s corporation, emphasizing the 
need for a legal duty to encourage open communications among the 
family in this situation.
63
 But this relationship did not involve the sort 
of open-ended control that usually supports a strict duty of 
unselfishness. Rather, it only extended the corporation’s rights to its 
information to the firm’s controlling family.64 
As with the other differences between business and domestic 
relationships discussed above, the domestic-business difference 
regarding fiduciary duties is analogous to that between business 
forms. Given the nature and function of fiduciary duties based on the 
complete delegation of control, fiduciary duties are as inappropriate 
for horizontal or co-equal relationships between business partners as 
they are between domestic partners. Both small business and intimate 
domestic relationships may deal better with fiduciary breach through 
exit and dissolution than by inviting litigation in ongoing 
relationships.
65
  
 
 60. See Ribstein, Partners, supra note 57, at 228–30. Ertman notes that ―husbands and 
wives both have the right to manage community property, and each spouse is a fiduciary in 
relation to the other regarding property management.‖ Ertman, supra note 2, at 121. This 
appears to refer to duties arising out of joint management of property rather than conventional 
fiduciary duties arising from delegation of control.  
 61. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 62. Id. at 568–70.  
 63. Id. at 577–80 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 64. See Ribstein, Partners, supra note 57, at 230. 
 65. See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 248 
(1995) (concluding that this approach is best explained ―by the disinclination of courts to deal 
with the enforcement of liability rules in the family setting‖). 
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6. Transfer 
Unlike business association owners, spouses cannot transfer either 
management or financial rights in their relationships. This contrasts 
with even very small and close-knit partnerships in which members 
can convey their financial rights in the business to non-members or 
each other by taking out loans backed by their economic interests in 
the partnership or by outright sale.
66
 This difference reflects the 
fundamental distinction between domestic and business associations 
regarding separation of the association from the individual members. 
Business associations provide a mechanism for capitalizing the 
owners’ interests in the separate venture while domestic associations 
are inextricably tied to their members. The extent of transferability, in 
turn, relates to other rules, including exit. Barring even a limited form 
of exit through financial transfer binds the members of a domestic 
association closely and makes their ability to dissolve the relationship 
more important than in a partnership. 
7. Exit 
Apparent similarities between domestic and business associations 
mask fundamental differences. This is clearest in connection with 
exit. Fifty years ago marriage had a no-exit rule stricter than the one 
in corporations. Under this marriage rule, even spouses’ unanimous 
agreement was not necessarily enough to dissolve the relationship. 
This rule reflected the assumption that spouses make a significant 
commitment to the relationship, so that enabling easy exit facilitates 
opportunism. This rule is somewhat analogous to ―capital lock-in‖ in 
corporations, where the permanence of the relationship also 
facilitates and encourages long-term investment.
67
 The no-exit rule in 
 
 66. For provisions in the Uniform Partnership Act dealing with the transferability of 
financial interests, see UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 27–28 (1914); REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP 
ACT §§ 503–504 (1997). 
 67. The concept of ―capital lock-in‖ refers to when shareholders in a closely held 
corporation are unable to sell their shares, and they cannot compel the corporation to pay out 
income or sell assets. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law 
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 388–89 
(2003) (arguing that the concept of capital lock-in allowed modern corporations to grow 
because it encourages long-term investment). 
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domestic relationships also reflected third parties’ (particularly 
children’s) interest in the stability of domestic associations.68  
Marriage has evolved from a no-exit rule to no-fault divorce.
69
 In 
this respect, marriage draws closer to partnership, another intimate 
relationship in which dissolution seems to be the best way of 
resolving disagreement. However, the parties often must pay to leave 
a domestic association. As discussed above, this reflects society’s 
general demand that family members commit to the family’s welfare. 
Domestic associations have mandatory rules to provide socially 
important domestic stability and to cover the support needs of women 
and children.
70
 
Commentators and policymakers recently have emphasized a 
―partnership‖ model for marriage stressing equal division of property 
adopted by several states.
71
 However, the partnership model of 
marriage differs fundamentally from actual partnership because of the 
mandatory nature of marriage rules. Since partnerships are 
unnecessary for social support, partnership dissolution rules need not 
be mandatory. Although partnership has an equal division default rule 
that looks somewhat like the marital partnership model, this rule 
holds only in the most primitive default partnerships where equality 
reflects the multiplicity of human capital, financial, and credit 
contributions owners typically make to a very small firm.
72
 This is 
intended merely as a starting point for customized agreements. Rather 
than reflecting the parties’ usual expectations, it often functions as a 
―penalty‖ default to force the parties to bargain explicitly for 
variations to reflect complexity in contributions.
73
 Partnership law 
enforces these customized contracts in order to avoid unduly 
penalizing partners who want to exit and thereby to facilitate risk-
 
 68. See Scott, supra note 22, at 11. 
 69. Id. at 10. 
 70. See Helene S. Shapo, “A Tale Of Two Systems”: Anglo-American Problems in the 
Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 707, 724 (1993) (discussing 
provisions for the continued support of the deceased’s family). 
 71. See sources cited supra note 2.  
 72. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of 
Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1421–23 (1996) (critiquing 
the marriage as a partnership model, specifically with dissolution). 
 73. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95–97 (1989). 
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taking and entrepreneurship. Contracts can balance the need for exit 
against the need for stability to facilitate long-term investments.  
This is not to suggest that the present distinction between 
partnership and marriage dissolution rules is necessarily optimal. A 
potential problem with attaching heavy costs to marital dissolution is 
that this leaves the parties with no easy way to resolve tension in the 
marriage, given the spouses’ inability to litigate during marriage.74 
Although domestic ties of love and affection and the spouses’ 
commitment to a long-term relationship provide powerful incentives 
to resolve disputes, a marriage, like a business partnership, might 
become unproductive when these ties dissipate. This suggests that 
domestic associations may need to develop alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  
Although domestic relationships ultimately may evolve toward the 
contractual business association model of dissolution, the rules 
governing the two types of relationships are likely to continue to 
diverge because of the fundamental differences between domestic 
and business relationships. The social and emotional costs of a 
business breakup necessarily are moderated by the parties’ ability to 
find new partners who can help them maximize joint profits. 
Moreover, partnership law provides for exit rules based on the 
parties’ ex ante expectations about how long the relationship will 
last.
75
 By contrast, the parties to a domestic relationship are much less 
likely to have such expectations. Furthermore, the social and 
emotional costs of breakup are likely to remain higher for domestic 
than for business associations, and therefore are likely to continue to 
demand different rules. 
 
 74. For an argument favoring partnership and marriage rules that force the parties to 
dissolve the relationship rather than litigate while it is ongoing, see Levmore, supra note 65 
(discussing the ―love-it-or-leave-it‖ rules that require dissolution of partnerships prior to taking 
judicial action). 
 75. The partnership laws provide for wrongful dissolution, with damages and penalties, 
where a partner dissolves the partnership before the expiration of an agreed term. See UNIF. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 31(2), 38(2) (1914); REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 602(b), 801(2) 
(1997). 
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C. Family Businesses 
The Chestman case is interesting not only for its specific holding 
on fiduciary duties, but also for its general approach to the 
relationship between a domestic association and the business the 
family controls. The majority essentially viewed the family as 
separate from the business,
76
 while the dissent was willing to connect 
the two and find that, in effect, that the family had opted into at least 
one aspect of the corporate standard form.
77
 
This type of situation often arises in the informal partnership 
setting, where the court must decide whether a spouse operated a 
small business in partnership with the other spouse. Although the 
relationship may seem to have the usual partnership indicia of control 
and profit-sharing, these may actually be domestic arrangements. 
Thus, determining household partnerships is complicated by the fact 
that  
aspects of the relationship that would otherwise resemble 
partnership take on a different coloration in the family setting. 
The exercise of control by a spouse may be simply that of a 
helpmate in marriage rather than that of a partner; one spouse 
may share proceeds of the business in order to satisfy a support 
obligation.
78
  
Courts accordingly have occasionally refused to find partnerships in 
the family setting, including both marriage and non-marital 
cohabitation, despite the presence of partnership indicia.
79
  
 
 76. 947 F.2d 551, 568–71 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 77. Id. at 577–80 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 78. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 43, § 2.10.  
 79. See, e.g., In re Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 756–57 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that under 
New York law there was no partnership despite maintenance of joint account, noting that usual 
partnership indicia, including here joint ownership, profit sharing, and co-mingling of funds in a 
joint account, are ―blurred‖ by marital relationship); LaRoque v. LaHood, 613 A.2d 1033, 1042 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (finding that although wife participated in management and worked 
without salary or other direct compensation, services of a spouse, rendered while assisting the 
other spouse in the other spouse’s business, do not per se establish a partnership); Cleland v. 
Thirion, 268 A.D.2d 842. (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that there was no partnership as a 
matter of law, despite agreement providing that parties who are living as domestic partners have 
agreed to become business partners, where parties did not do business under partnership name 
or file partnership tax returns and alleged partner did not contribute capital and sought wages 
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Courts’ decisions in close cases may depend on changing norms 
regarding women’s role in the workplace. For example, in Gosman v. 
Gosman,
80
 the trial court found a spousal partnership based on the 
facts that the wife worked in the business and had the power to sign 
checks on the business’s joint account, although her husband made 
all the management decisions.
81
 The intermediate appellate court 
reversed, observing that the husband was ―entitled to‖ the wife’s 
services.
82
 The state’s highest court upheld the trial court.83 This case 
signals a judicial willingness to bridge differences between business 
and domestic associations.
84
  
While the family business opens the way to domestic 
relationships’ use of a conventional business association, it also 
increases the potential dangers of this approach. Under current law, a 
spousal business partnership is subject to separate rules for its 
business and domestic elements. However, this appropriate 
separation may be harder for courts and the parties to maintain if 
spouses can use either form, particularly given the family business’s 
usual informality.  
III. EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC ASSOCIATION FORMS 
Part II emphasizes the distinctions between marriage, the primary 
existing domestic standard form, and business associations. But 
domestic associations could evolve in a manner similar to the recent 
history of business associations. Until relatively recently, the 
corporate form clearly dominated business associations. General 
partnerships were significant mainly for small, ―default‖ businesses 
and professional firms, while limited partnership was a niche form 
for tax shelters. The close corporation developed from approximately 
 
for her services); Cooper v. Knox, 90 S.E.2d 844 (Va. 1956) (no partnership when wife handled 
all funds and books for contracting business, accepted a job for it, instructed workers, and read 
blueprints). 
 80. 309 A.2d 34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973), rev’d., 318 A.2d 821 (Md. 1974). 
 81. 309 A.2d at 69–70.  
 82. Id. at 77–78. 
 83. 318 A.2d at 823–24. 
 84. However, traditional attitudes persist in the cases. See, e.g., McGregor v. Crumley, 
775 N.W.2d 91, 99 (S.D. 2009) (holding that ―admittedly weak‖ evidence failed to establish 
partnership, ―given their status as husband and wife‖). 
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1950 to become the leading form for closely held firms.
85
 The reason 
for the corporation’s dominance was similar to that for marriage: the 
corporation was the officially sanctioned business association, and 
therefore the exclusive way to obtain public benefits conferred on 
business, particularly including limited liability.  
This situation has changed significantly for business associations 
over the last generation. Changing business conditions, new tax law, 
and increased jurisdictional competition caused the corporate form to 
yield much of its dominance for closely held firms to new flexible 
limited liability entities, particularly including the LLC.
86
 
Domestic associations might evolve in a similar way and for 
analogous reasons. Indeed, one commentator suggests the LLC as the 
vehicle for new forms of plural marriage.
87
 Just as new business 
conditions triggered the evolution of business associations, so new 
social conditions, particularly including same-sex marriage, changing 
women’s roles, the shrinking importance of traditional marriage, and 
the rising opportunity costs of child rearing, and new reproductive 
technologies, may lead to changes in domestic associations. The 
mechanisms of legal change are also similar in the two contexts, as 
each state in the United States and jurisdictions elsewhere in the 
world can experiment with new rules and relationship, forcing other 
jurisdictions to continually evaluate which relationships to recognize. 
These developments could erode the privileged status of marriage, 
just as the corporation’s once entrenched status was eroded.  
This process could result in the development and refinement of 
domestic association standard forms that differ from each other as 
well as from business forms. Indeed, jurisdictions already have 
adopted several variations on marriage, including domestic 
partnership laws that approach marriage in all but name.
88
 The new 
 
 85. See RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, supra note 9, at 95–118 (discussing the history of the 
close corporation). 
 86. Id. at 119–23. 
 87. See Ertman, supra note 2, at 127–31 (exploring the similarities between LLCs and 
plural marriage).  
 88. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2011) (providing that ―registered domestic 
partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same 
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . . as are granted to and imposed upon 
spouses‖). 
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forms might suit specific relationships, including not only gay 
families, but older adults, extended combinations of men and women, 
polygamous relationships, and so forth.
89
 These new forms then 
would have to seek recognition outside their enacting states. Courts 
and legislatures might confer that recognition, at least as to the most 
contractual aspects of domestic relationships. 
There are several important questions regarding this evolutionary 
process. First, what is the optimal number of domestic association 
templates? For example, might they include friendships as a distinct 
form of relationship?
90
 At some point the potential transaction costs 
of forcing people to learn about many different standard forms can 
outweigh the benefits of providing optimal standard forms.
91
 
Second, at what point might the perceived social externalities of 
new types of domestic relationships inhibit interstate recognition of 
new standard forms? Most states and the federal government already 
have enacted ―defense of marriage‖ statutes that attempt to preserve 
the privileged status of marriage over other types of domestic 
relationships.
92
 It is not clear whether and how long this rigidity can 
survive the demand for new standard forms to accommodate diverse 
relationships. 
Third, will domestic associations eventually evolve to embrace the 
business analogy suggested by recent commentators despite the 
reasons discussed in this paper for separating the two models? As the 
privileging of traditional marriage law subsides, the attraction of 
more flexible and contract-friendly business forms may erode more 
nuanced objections concerning the inappropriateness of business 
 
 89. For suggestions along these lines, see Drobac & Page, supra note 2, at 402–06 
(suggesting various domestic partnership standard forms modeled on partnership law); Ertman, 
supra note 2 (suggesting standard forms modeled on the partnership, LLC, and corporation).  
 90. See generally ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2010) (proposing special legal 
treatment of friendship). But see Eric A. Posner, Huck and Jim and Law, THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(Feb. 21, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/book/review/friend-transformation-ethan-leib 
(criticizing Leib’s suggestion of such special legal treatment and noting that ―[t]he law treats 
friendships differently from marriages because they really are different‖). 
 91. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 47 (2000). 
 92. Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage Legal in Six States, STATELINE, http://www.stateline. 
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forms in domestic relationships. This is especially true if domestic 
relations come to more closely resemble business associations 
through the spread of more open and polygamous relationships. 
Legally recognizing a contractual model could sweep away 
constitutional restrictions on jurisdictional choice and the 
enforcement of marriage that are based on public policy concerns. If 
families are simply business associations, states would no longer 
have a basis for refusing to enforce their choice of law contracts.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Business associations and marriage are similar in their basic 
functions because they need to deal with analogous long-term human 
relationships and the agency, opportunism, and other foibles that 
arise in these relationships. But the need for separate standard forms 
suggests that there are important differences in how these standard 
forms should be structured. This Article emphasizes that the law 
should provide for multiple standard forms in each category while 
recognizing the appropriate similarities and differences. 
Understanding these issues could prevent experiments with business 
forms in domestic settings from threatening the integrity of both 
business and family law. However, careful evolution of business 
forms would not necessarily preclude ultimate convergence of 
business and domestic standard forms. Distinct standard forms should 
facilitate but not drive these social judgments.  
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